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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Distinctiveness and Necessity of American Political 
Development 
SUZANNE METTLER AND RICHARD M. VALELLY 
THIS volume showcases an cinalytic approach to researching and understanding US 
politics that first came on the scene some thirty years ago; it carries the same name as its 
subject of study-''.American political development" or APD. APD still retains a critical 
edge that can be traced to its origins as a dissenting form of political science. An insur-
gent group of scholars associated with the general renewal of historical institutionalism 
(March and Olsen 1984) urged colleagues across the social sciences to "bring the state 
back in;' publishing an edited volume under that banner (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and 
Skocpol 1985). Stephen Skowronek's roughly contemporaneous book, Building a New 
American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920, epito-
mized the value of applying such an approach to American politics (Skowronek 1982). 
Skowronek's study-now regarded as a classic_:.:_traced the fraught, arduous struggle to 
construct government agencies that could better accomplish crucial tasks of govern-
ance. It thus put the development of state capacity front and center as a major dynamic 
that ramified throughout all of American politics. 
In 1986 Karen Orren and Skowronek launched a journal entitled Studies in American 
Political Development, thereby coining and entrenching the term "American political 
development:' Also, Amy Bridges played a critical role in founding, along with David 
Brady, the Politics and History Organized Section of the American Political Science 
Association. The APD approach truly took flight 1 
The study of APD has attracted not only scholars who directly focus on its various 
facets and concerns but also many other scholars who have other primary interests-
such as the presidency and Congress-and who find the APD sensibility quite useful for 
enriching their studies. As Jeffery Jenkins shows in this volume, a remarkably similar 
interest in understanding institutions and their history simultaneously emerged among 
rational choice scholars as they took stock of the instability theorems. These theorems 
2 SUZANNE METTLER AND RICHARD M. VALELLY 
(the Arrow Theorem, the Condorcet Paradox, and the McKelvey Chaos Theorem, to 
name the best known) raised the obvious question of why there was so much real world 
stability (Tullock 1981). The door to institutional analysis-and to treatment of insti-
tutional creation, evolution, and stability-consequently swung open in that part of 
political science as well. 
Moreover, a consciously historical and evolutionary sensibility has migrated into the 
behavioral core of the field. Increasingly political behavior scholars have considered 
how to recover public opinion and its determinants and representational consequences 
before the rise of the modern survey. (See, for example, Dykstra and Hahn 1968; Lee 
2002; Karol 2007.) Thanks to the award-winning efforts of Adam Berinsky and Eric 
Schickler-with input from several talented colleagues-the earliest "modern'' surveys 
of the 1930s and 1940s have been reconstructed and reweighted, permitting a wide range 
of new investigations into the rise of mass liberalism and conservatism in the twentieth 
century (Berinsky 2006; Berinsky, Powell, Schickler, and Yohai 2011). 
APD scholars have also considered whether and how policy feedback alters the mass 
bases of politics-and thus the options available to party politicians and elected officials 
(Pierson 1993; Campbell 2012). In/loing this, they have shown that the state sometimes 
shapes society as much as society shapes the state. A paradigmatic case is the GI Bill. It 
fed back into American politics and decisively generated the civic engagement of a key 
population among the citizenry-returning World War II veterans (Mettler 2005; see 
also Mettler and Milstein 2007). 
Given how extensively the APD approach has recast the study of American politics, 
we believed that the time had clearly come for a Handbook on American Political 
Development. As its editors we have spent the past several years considering what 
has evolved over the decades following APD's birth. We have solicited the collection 
of essays here to indicate the value, scope, and promise of pursuing it. The volume 
is not, we hasten to add, exhaustive. Nonetheless, the contents of the volume speak 
for themselves, indicating the breadth and depth of the approach and the many ave-
nues it offers for furthering our understanding of American politics. Our contribu-
tion, with this introduction, is not to preview and summarize each essay but instead 
to offer broad observations about the distinctiveness of APD and its value to the 
larger discipline. 
A WIDE-ANGLE LENS 
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of APD analysis is the ambitious scope and 
historical depth of the analysis that its followers often undertake. Much of the study of • 
American politics takes what Paul Pierson has dubbed a "pizza pie approach:' Pierson 
pictures "[h]ighly institutionalized and very large communities of researchers" who 
"focus on particular slices of the political system (Congress, the presidency, interest 
groups, parties, etc.):' Each of these, in turn, focuses on specific "sites and modes of 
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political activity;' meaning particular institutions, or forms of organization, or types of 
political action (Pierson 2007, 147.) This creates high-resolution precision and clarity-
and yields deep understandings of a wide range of vital phenomena, such as the politics 
of congressional committee jurisdictions, the rise of czars in the White House, whether 
referenda produce civic engagement, and the variability of Supreme Court medians, just 
to name a few. Meanwhile, the methodological individualism that suffuses American 
political science has also pushed ever further into cognitive and affective psychology, 
neurobiology, and genetics. Combined with the explosion of experimentalism, these 
inquiries have opened up new and exciting vistas on American democracy's individual-
level foundations. 
APD plays, however; an equally vital role by exploiting the possibilities of ;'macro" 
and longitudinal treatment of American politics. Scholars of APD typically use a wider-
angle lens in their analysis, looking at the historically evolved relationship between some 
institution and some type of organization or activity, or more broadly, at the politics that 
has emerged between a pair of institutions, or even at the level of the political system as a 
whole, across the federal or state levels or between them. (See, for instance, Crowe 2012; 
Lavelle 2013; Schickler 2001.) APD embraces holism. To put the point another way, APD 
helps analysts.of American politics to see the pizza for the slices! 
The wide-angle lens indeed permits APD scholars to broach the proverbial "big ques-
tions:' They include the origins and temporal variability of power in the American polit-
ical system and how it operates, the striking persistence of constitutional forms despite 
the Civil War and the New Deal, when and how political change occurs, the legitimacy 
of the administrative state, who gets represented by a given set of political circum-
stances, how such developments affect society or the economy, whether the American 
regime nurtures virtue, character, and generous civic engagement, whether the public 
interest can be identified and prevail, the extent to which civil-military relations are 
healthy, whether public problems can be addressed and solved, whether government is 
bloated, the many meanings of citizenship-and, not least, the survival of the American 
regime itself. These questions constituted the major concerns of such erstwhile lumi-
naries as (among others) Martha Derthick, Samuel P. Huntington, Theodore Lowi, and 
James Q. Wilson. 
APD scholarship aspires to carry on that ambitious legacy. As the discipline of politi-
cal science has matured the monographic studies that self-consciously engage these 
kinds of big questions can certainly be found-for example, in the work of Larry Bartels 
and Nolan McCarty, who happen 'to be two of our volume contributors. But our pair 
of examples make our point: senipr scholars typically ask the big questions, but junior 
scholars refrain from doing so. The premium on methodological virtuosity has never 
been greater. Add to that the new and overriding interest in resolving problems of causal 
inference. Many scholars today easily conclude that they ought to first work long and 
hard in the positivist trenches-helping to build a "normal science" of experimental 
results that are reported in very rigorous and brief articles-before they dare to look up 
toward the horizon of regime-level issues.2 The obvious concern is that if they put off 
learning how to think at the regime level they may never get to do it at all. 
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By contrast, the study of American political development more readily breaks open 
regime-level questions. It does this because of its holism, its emphasis on vital arcs of 
change, and its attendant effort to figure out what they mean. There is a trade-off: the 
reliability of the proposed causal inferences is not taken as utterly primary (though 
they are taken quite seriously through various kinds of checks, such as counterfactual 
analysis.) But by the same token we try to honestly figure out what the wide-angle 
view is telling us. 
, One very useful consequence-as Kimberly Morgan's chapter suggests-is the facili-
tation of cross-national comparative analysis. (For an example of what we mean, one 
that draws in part on APD work, see Stepan and Linz 2011.) We hardly claim that all APD 
work operates nimbly at the level of "the regime:' Much APD work certainly focuses on 
elaborating and extending the generalizations and formulations ofleading APD schol-
ars rather than breaking new ground. But we do think that there is more of an "elective 
affinity" -to borrow from Goethe (2000 [1809])-between APD work and regime-level 
reflection and generalization. As we have emphasized, several of the contributions to 
this volume reflect that elective affini~. 
I 
INSTITUTIONS MATTER 
As the previous discussion has suggested, the phrase "institutions matter" also captures 
much of what APD is known for. Broadly speaking, by "institutions" we mean the rules 
and procedures that structure behavior and provide incentives, norms, and resources 
that shape it. Most APD scholars would include formal governmental institutions: exec-
utive bureaucracies, insulated policymakers in central banks and courts, legislatures, 
and local and special purpose governments. They also mean the internal structure of 
legislatures, their leadership positions, and their norms. Public law, and public policy-
including foreign policy, colonial administration, and national security policy-also 
count. Informal institutions and organizations, such as political parties, groups, and 
movements, clearly fall within the institutional purview. So do politically created mar-
ket institutions-property rights, government-created technologies that undergird 
commerce, or commercial and admiralty law-that facilitate and regulate commerce 
and trade. 
What does not count? This is a tough question. Elinor Ostrom's Nobel Prize-winning 
work on conventions unsupported by property rights is self-consciously institutional-
ist (Ostrom 1990). APD scholars have a similarly catholic view of institutions. We do 
not even draw the line where anthropology begins, say, with handshakes. After all, the 
Supreme Court was different after Chief Justice Melville Fuller instituted the conference 
handshake. Political life requires many sorts of institutions. 
Of course, as our reference to Ostrom is meant to underscore and as we noted at the 
outset, many scholars not affiliated with APD focus on institutions as well. Among the 
many social science communities which know that "institutions matter" are rational 
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choice institutionalists, including scholars who study veto pivots and their consequences 
for policy, public law, and executive and legislative agenda setting and bargaining. APD 
is indeed just one part of the "new institutionalism'' that emerged in the 1980s and has 
moved in several different directions since then. 
What APD has added, however, is a stronger preoccupation with the emergence and 
relative durability of American national institutions; policy domains, and governance 
arrangements. Here's an example of a question in the APD vein: does Congress con-
tinue to be a highly salient institution, and why or why not? In his work on Congress, for 
example, David Mayhew has asked why Congress has remained viable-and has con-
nected the answer to ho~ Congress is a valued source of consequential careers for tal-
euted and ambitious professional politicians. In taking advantage of that opportunity 
structure members of Congress have strutted on the political stage, sought to shape pub-
lic opinion-and simultaneously renewed and adapted Congress to the Sysyphean task 
of remaining a central player in the Madisonian system (Mayhew 2000). Sarah Binder, 
by contrast, has shown that rising partisan polarization, in combination with institu-
tional arrangements and divided government, has reduced productivity in lawmaking 
(Binder 2003, 2015). 
Or how and why has the Fed's inde~endence grown despite its role in deepening the 
1981-82 recession and in precipitating the 2007-9 recession? Despite periods of sharp 
congressional criticism, the Fed's monetary and financial-regulatory authority remains 
more-not less-powerful in shaping both macroeconomic performance and distribu-
tion. Why? Scholars are currently at work on these questions as well (Binder and Spindel 
2013; Jacobs and King 2016). 
Historically oriented scholars treat these sorts of questions and puzzles. They exercise 
a keen awareness that adaptive or reconstitutive institutional change is a central dynamic 
in American politics-one that appeared very early. Milkis has shown that the Founders 
separated into party factions in part to save the Constitution from Hamilton's efforts to 
build a strong central state appa'ratus. Swift revealed that early in the nineteenth cen-
tury the Senate was changed from being something like a House of Lords into a popu-
larly responsive and accountable legislature (Milkis 1999; Swift 1996). APD scholarship 
captures, in other words, the contingent evolution of institutions, tracing the struggles 
of actors inside institutions and organizations to perpetuate them, to reconstitute how 
they work, or to adapt them to new challenges. 
One also sees this preoccupation with institutionally reconstitutive moments in the 
growing APD literature on the Civil War ahd Reconstruction (Bensel 1990; Brandwein 
1999; Valelly 2014, 2004)-and in careful studies of major social policy shifts (Skocpol 
1992) and in moments of regime stress (Katznelson 2014). The APD literature on interest 
groups and protest movements-and a very rich APD parties literature-also under-
score how APD is particularly attentive to alteration and adaptation over time, usefully 
denaturalizing what otherwise would seem familiar or normal to us today. The interest 
group system and its "pressure tactics" and the Washington-based standing congres-
siomi.l lobby are inventions, forged in specific historical contexts. Formative political 
contexts have included, for example, the exclusion of women from the franchise and 
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the one-party dominance of Republicans in agricultural states (Clemens 1997; Hansen 
1991). Likewise, post-WWII civil rights protest in the South was critically led and shaped 
by the skills and confidence of returning black veterans, thus opening a fresh angle on a 
familiar story (Parker 2009 ). 
-
IDEAS MATTER 
As we have just stressed, APD theorizes and lucidly traces previously unexplored but 
consequential, formal and informal macroinstitutional pivots, developmental paths, 
and outcomes. More than other parts of the study of American politics, APD scholar-
ship also holds that political ideas matter-that is, that they are independent forces in 
politics and in the life of the American regime, as the chapters in this volume by Ericson 
and Morone so richly demonstrate. 
Prominent among treatments of constitutive ideas are those focusing on civic ideals 
and jurisprudential and constitutional innovation. The basic text here, of course, is Louis 
Hartz's 1955 masterpiece (Hartz 1955). The most sophisticated and persuasive treatment 
to date of the constitutive role of political ideas-a magnum opus which eclipses Hartz's 
achievement-is Rogers Smith's now classic identification of competing "civic ideals;' 
that is, very richly developed, conflicting ideational traditions about who deserves 
American citizenship (Smith 1997). Quite recently, in a painstaking reconstruction of 
a now lost world of nineteenth-century rights discourse, Pamela Brandwein has shown 
that the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction decades were periods of exceptionally 
creative thinking about the meaning of rights on the Supreme Court (Brandwein 2011). 
Zackin has shown that those who have made and developed state constitutions have 
done something similar-created a little known but potent tradition of "positive rights" 
(Zackin 2013). 
The constitutive role ofideas has also been traced for public philosophies and, in par-
ticular, for how intellectuals, activists, and-of course national party politicians have tried 
to reconstitute institutions and to entrench or embed these philosophies in those insti-
tutions. Thus Howard Gillman has shown how late nineteenth-century Republicans 
sought to embed their public philosophy through strategies of judicial recruitment and 
institutional design of the judiciary-and in a companion study has shown how liberal 
Democratic presidents sought to do the same in order to entrench modern judicial liber-
alism in the courts ( Gillman 2002, 2006). Looking at a very different "ism;' Steven Teles 
has provided a particularly nuanced and rich treatment of the "long march" of modern 
legal conservatives to change the judiciary and other national institutions (Teles 2008). 
Political economic ideas have also played a formative role in creating the American 
polity. This is shown by scholars in what might be called the "MIT School" of American 
political development, which flourished in the 1990s. Its inspiration came from how 
Suzanne Berger and Charles Sabel thought about the historical politics of markets and 
industrialization, technology, and manufacturing. Its exemplars demonstrated that 
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political economic visions-such as powerful and elaborate theories of how to shape 
industrial conflict (Hattam 1993), monetary policy (Ritter 1997), railroadization (Berk 
1994; Dunlavy 1994), trade (Shoch 2001), and scientific innovation (Hart 1998)-in 
turn ramified \nto party politics, economic growth, union formation, trade policy, 
technology formation, and governmental planning capacities. Political economic 
analysis can be seen, as well, in the magisterial studies of the late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century political parties produced by Sanders (treating the Democrats) and 
Bensel (treating the Republicans)-works which show that, unlike non-ideological, 
vote-getting, catch-all parties, the major parties instead had highly sophisticated.eco-
nomic regulatory programs after the Civil War and into the early twentieth century 
(Sanders 1999; Bense! 2000 ). ' 
IDENTITY FORMATION AND CIVIC STATUS 
APD scholarship also increasingly attends to the political construction of identities and 
civic status. On this view, race, gender, ethnicity, class, the family, and sexual orienta-
tion are not pre-political identities, whose origins and evolution are best traced by social 
psychology and sociology. Instead, they are, in significant part, political constructs. The 
sense of linked fate that informs an individual's conscious identification with a "race" 
or a group or a gender originates in, for example, party strategies, in how public policy 
creates or sharply reinforces ascriptive differences and hierarchies, and in the power of 
ideas. Particularly useful in this regard is the founc;lational work of Desmond King. His 
corpus of work underscores both the role of the state and of "racial orders" ( that in turn 
are undergirded by democratizing or hierarchy-preserving coalitions) in entrenching or 
dissolving illiberal racial binaries ( e.g., King 2007; King and Smith 2011). 
' 
YEs, THERE Is A STATE 
Another basic contribution of APD scholarship is its insistence that, like other polities, 
America has a state. By that we mean a coherently ( though not necessarily tightly) con-
nected ensemble oflegitimate, stable, and resilient (but also evolving) national and sub-
national institutions of representation and legislation, governance, and jurisprudence 
building. Skillful professionals cir~ulate into and out of these institutions according to 
various calendars and schedules. Their linkages to political parties, elections, groups, 
and public opinion shape their actions, views, decisions, and behavior. But such actions, 
critically, are imperfectly monitored, even if there are robust, independent private com-
munications media (DeCanio 2016). While responsive to social demands and public 
opinion the men and women in the state are therefore also "autonomous;' that is, their 
views and behavior are rooted in intellectual worldviews, public philosophy, "reason of 
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state:' professional ethics, entrepreneurial visions of new roles for government, access 
.to and dialogue with experts, and of course patriotism and public spirit. Systems of rev-
enue extraction support this ensemble of institutions and people (Einhorn 2006; Levi 
1988; Pollack 2009). So does access to copious amounts of reliable and longitudinal data 
about the economy and society and expert evaluations of these data (Kelman 1987 ). Not 
least, a monopoly over the legitimate means of force, exercised within territorial bound-
aries and constructed, expanded, and defended over the course of a national history, 
protects and legitimates the nation and its representatives and rulers. 
At one time APD's recognition that America has a state, particularly APD's emphasis 
on the relative autonomy of the American state, was controversial. Around 1990 one of 
, us faced ridicule at a job talk for asserting that there is a state in America, and was told 
quite emphatically-to the room's evident approval-that to talk about the American 
state was to talk nonsense. Sii:ice the author was then untenured, anxious, and unwilling 
to set off fireworks, awkward silence ensued during this Alice-in-Wonderland moment. 
But a voice in the author's head asked, "What about the Joint Economic Committee? 
The Fed? The CIA? The Pentagon? The Executive Office of the President? The FBI? SEC? 
FAA? FDA? CBO? OMB? BEAYBIA? EPA? CEA? DEA? LEAA? NIST? NLRB? FMS? 
DARPA? IRS?" For a long, di~tracting moment the acronyms would not stop! 
To be fair, the kernel of truth in the pompous censure· was a sound point, namely, 
that talking about the American state can lead to abstract theorizing of the hand-waving 
variety. There is some danger of this, of course-but we are struck by how the institu-
tional orientation of APD scholars instead inclines them to concretely identify and 
document the variety and functioning of actual arrangements that undergird American 
governance. 
APD scholarship on the state is also particularly focused-borrowing from the 
discipline's methodological individualism and emphasis on agency-on the role of 
state-builders. This has everything to do with the ambiguous constitutional status of the 
state. As Alexander Hamilton's obsession with and career in early state building suggest, 
the US Constitution indicated little about how the new nation should develop governing 
capacity. Federal bureaucracies have varied in their governing authority or accountabil-
ity to other political actors or the public. Exploiting the ambiguity in the Constitution, 
innovative bureaucratic leaders have ~nhanced their agencies' legitimacy and effective-
ne.ss through forging ties with organ~ations and others in civil society ( Carpenter 2001, 
2010; Moore 2011; Roberts 2013). 
Moreover, as we already noted, ''t,he state" is not just in Washington, DC. Throughout 
American history, the federal government has encouraged, coerced, or cajoled the indi-
vidual states to develop their capacity to serve many governing functions-and vice 
versa (Derthick 2001). States have also done much on their own, often serving as sites 
for the development of positive rights (Zackin 2013) and policy experimentation (as 
Andrew Karch notes in this volume). In addition, American government has channeled 
considerable governing authority through private or non-profit channels, subsidizing 
or inviting organizations and business to provide services or to distribute resources that 
it finances (Smith and Lipsky 1993; Dobbin and Sutton 1998). Strikingly Congress built 
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a robust private enforcement regime of civil rights litigation led by lawyers outside the 
federal government (Farhang 2010 ). 
Relatedly, APD scholars' interest in the American state has led them to appreciate how 
the resources inherent in public policies become valued by politicians and citizens even 
as government's role in bestowing them may simultaneously seem "out of sight;' "hid-
den:' or "submerged" (Howard 1997; Mettler 2011). That paradoxical evolution, APD has 
shown, has emerged historically and developmentally, and it is the cumulative result 
of policy design, the making of the tax code, bureaucratic evolution, and the creation 
of a myriad of government-sponsored enterprises (e.g., Fannie Mae, Farmer ,Mac, or 
Sallie Mae) and other private-public partnerships (such as the Federal Accounting 
Standards Board). 
I 
Indeed, structuring the role of the state and of government policy in the lives of 
Americans has been a central project of elected officials throughout· the course of 
American political development (Balogh 2009; Sparrow 2011). The titanic struggle over 
Obamacare has revolved in large part around whether and how to "bring the state in:' 
But the struggle has been more than a clash over the size of government and program 
· affordability; ultimately th~ Affordable Care Act may change how Americans think 
about the state in their lives_:__and about public policy more generally. 
APD scholars do not see society alone as the prime mover in politics, and neither do 
they understand that role to fall to the state; instead state and society interact in that 
process, they are joined in a dance over time. Elected officials know that there is a cer-
tain social wariness about government-and they can choose to reinforce it, to accom-
modate it even as they expand the role of government, or to consciously challenge it, 
knowing that the time is ripe for the challenge to succeed. (For general and formal dis-
cussion see Levi 1988.) For instance, the federal government, needing quick access to 
revenue, instituted tax withholding during WWII. The emergency made that possible. 
Most ironically, a young Milton Friedman dreamed up the idea (Zelenak 2013, 12, ch. 5). 
That was a state-centered change which reconfigured the terrain of politics-and after 
the war created a new normal. 
Besides state-society interactions of these sorts, APD scholarship also takes state 
capacity seriously-the variable (which is sometimes dependent, sometimes independ-
ent) that Skowronek brought to everyone's attention in 1982. By state capacity we mean 
"government being able to do what its various legitimate principals want it to do when 
they want it to:' As an independent variable it augments what officials, groups, and citi-
zens can do in politics. But it can also constrain such actors. In a terrible crisis state 
capacity can "sputter" -as Graham Allison showed in hair-raising detail in his pioneer-
ing treatment of the Cuban Miisile Crisis (Allison 1971). 
Much of the literature on state capacity often ( and correctly) assumes that state capac-
ity, in a democratic context, is a democratic good. Strong or supple state capacity can 
expand the menu of collectively useful initiatives for officials and citizens to think about 
and discuss. Democracy features open public debate about how government ought to 
acquire and deploy public resources-such as revenue, infrastructure, access to high-
grade expertise, accurate and appropriate information about society and the economy, 
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or means of coercion. Such debate would matter little if government could not actually 
accomplish broad goals that are defined through open debate and other distinctively 
democratic institutions and processes. 
The focus on state capacity accordingly allows searching investigation of such large 
matters as competent ( or flawed) macroeconomic guidance ( Grossman 2013). Instances 
of both capacity and incapacity in this domain can be seen in the recent performance of 
the Federal Reserve. Its weakness in financial regulation helped to precipitate the epic 
· financial crisis of Fall 2008-but the creativity that it and the Treasury showed in stabi-
lizing finance and credit helped. to rescue the American economy from a catastrophic 
contraction. · 
State capacity can also be market making. Consider in this connection the Food and 
Drug Administration. It has been forced to constantly balance demands to cut regula-
tory corners and at the same time assure the efficacy and safety of pharmaceuticals. Yet in 
sustaining its regulatory capacities the FDA has been a major market maker ( Carpenter 
2010). The pharmaceutical industry in the United States would not exist in the form it 
does wi~out the American state. Americans ingest a steady diet of useful ( and for mil-
lions life-enhancing) pharmaceuticals because the American state is competent. 
APD's appreciation of the state hartlly means, though, that APD scholars are cheer-
leaders for Leviathan. Nietzsche wrote that "the state is the coldest of all cold monsters ... " 
( quoted in Rose and Miller 1992, 173). While hardly going that far in our view of the 
state, we candidly acknowledge that state capacity has a very troubling side as well 
(Scott1998). 
That aspect of state capacity can be seen all through American history-starting with 
"Indian removal" and the establishment of an administrative state to govern Native 
Americans (Rockwell 2010). Another example is the enforcement of the 1850 Fugitive 
Slave Act (Lubet 2010). Consider, too, the rise of colonial and imperial administration 
early in the twentieth century (Moore 2011), the internment of Japanese Americans 
during WWII (Hayashi 2008), the little-known role of eugenics and state-sponsored 
sterilization (Hansen and King 2013), and the rise of the carceral state over the past gen-
eration (see Lerman and Weaver in this volume). Although these illiberal and punitive 
facets of the state capacity variable have not received as much attention as the democ-
racy-enhancing sides, various contemporary phenomena-the national security state 
(Goldsmith 2012), the congressional maintenance of a military-industrial complex 
(Thorpe 2013), and the carceral state (Gottschalk 2014)-are helping, properly, to put 
"dark state capacity" on the APD agenda. 
HISTORY MATTERS 
APP also holds that "history matters:' All analysts of American politics grasp the 
relevance of history, to be sure. What APD counsels, however, is putting history first, as 
opposed to shoehorning seemingly stylized facts about American political history here 
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and there into one's work. Do history systematically and explicitly, we say, and question 
existing assumptions about what the facts actually are. 
We also debate the many kinds of historical dynamics that shape American poli-
tics. We investigate the existence of secular trends, such as modernization, bureauc-
ratization, or democratization. In some instances, the more striking phenomenon in 
American politics is the persistence of very deep continuities. As Mayhew has often 
remarked concerning the continuity of the Constitution of 1787-and as Louis Hartz 
first argued, albeit more by way of bemoaning the limits of American political cul-
ture-perhaps a deep kind of non-development characterizes American politics (Hartz 
1955; Mayhew 2000; Huntington 1968, ch. 2). Concerning presidential elections, Larry 
Bartels has carefully documented the regularity and strength of electoral, competitive-
ness (Bartels 1998). As King and Smith have argued, racial orders are a permanent fea-
ture of American politics (King and Smith 2011). 
But besides these steady-state constants and continuities we also wonder about a 
different kind of constant-namely, various forms of recurrence. While the theory 
of electoral realignment is dead (Mayhew 2002), the concept of recurring "regimes" 
in presidential politics has gained considerable traction due to the analytic elegance 
and power of Skowronek's handling of the idea in his portrayal of the presidency in 
American politics (Skowronek 1997). APD scholars have indeed long argued for the 
causal role and comparability of cycles and powerful public moods focused on uplift-
ing political renewal (Huntington 1981; Mayhew 2005; Morone 1990, 2003). Religious 
awakenings have shaped American politics more than once. The counterpoint between 
renewal and entropy can extend to the political economy and to society. Thus increases 
in income inequality and the emergence of debate over whether the super-rich are a 
problem for American democracy has happened more than once (Hacker and Pierson 
2010; Mettler 2015). America has experienced not one but two comparable "reconstruc-
tions" of African American voting rights and Southern party and electoral politics 
(Valelly2004). ' 
Mark Twain supposedly said something to the effect that while history may not 
repeat itself it certainly rhymes. He actually never said it (no one knows who did), but 
the idea captures a truth about a polity that displays the kind of stability and conti-
nuities that the American system has shown. We are a nation still strongly'tethered, for 
better or worse (Levinson 2006), to the Constitution of 1787. It would be surprising if, 
over the course of nearly two and a half centuries, political history did not repeat itself 
(Haydu 1998). 
Awareness that "history matters" also sensitizes APD scholars to the role of events 
and contingency-a valuable corrective for the tendency that all of us have to think 
that historical processes probably had to take the forms that they did (Shapiro and Bedi 
2007). Accordingly, APD scholarship is also alive to the role of turning points and "criti-
cal junctures" -and their larger consequences (Soifer 2012; but see Collins 2007). In the 
evolution of policy domains, change can happen incrementally, yes-but policy change 
also happens through the episodic (sometimes fortuitous) opening of policy windows 
that permit non-incremental change (Kingdon 2003). 
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One turning point that regularly has been revisited and debated is the political 
incorporation of organized labor (Hattam 1993; Orren 1991). In most advanced democ-
racies the process of industrialization generated social stresses that, in turn, fostered 
labor radicalism of various kinds. But Debsian socialism, despite its surge before WWI, 
never transitioned into a significant political force outside certain Northern cities 
and states and parts of the Upper Midwest. What explains the exceptionalist outcome 
in the United States? (Archer 2007; Lipset and Marks 2000). The question matters for 
comparativists-but it also matters a great deal for understanding the subsequent role of 
organized labor in American politics (Greenstone 1977; Roof 2011; Vossing 2012). 
Or consider polarization: the process by which party politicians have separated and 
sorted themselves into rival, behaviorally cohesive, and fairly disciplined ideologic'al 
camps (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006: 3). Polarization began in the 1970s and 
has deepened since then (apparently asymmetrically, with the Republican Party mov-
ing further to the right than Democrats have moved to the left). In turn, that sorting 
process has ( among other effects) complicated and changed the leadership tasks of con-
gressional leaders and how they coordinate campaign finance, committee assignments, 
and communication with the publl 1t probably reduces the rate of policy enactment 
(see McCarty, this volume). In other words, looking back we can see that the mid-197os 
constituted a major turning point in APD (Borstelmann 2011). 
As our discussion of polarization would suggest, an idea connected to the turning 
point concept is path dependence (Pierson 2000). The basic idea here is that a turning 
point becomes a process that feeds on itself and deepens-and that that happens in con-
siderable part because more and more people adjust their behavior to take account of 
the process. They act on the expectation that the process not only is here to stay but that 
its emergence also requires them to adjust, or that it is materially valuable to adjust to it. 
They thereby-and rather paradoxically-"lock in'' the process. 
A particularly salient instance in social policy, as Paul Pierson first pointed out, is the 
contributory finance, old-age income security program that we call Social Security. As 
participation in the program widened and as millions began to count on it, a second 
order consequence was the emergence of network externalities-that is, the creation of 
linkages between the program and, for instance, private pension planning or the rise of 
retirement communities. The policy began to "feed back'' into the society and economy 
in ways that then permanently altered the context for debate and reform of the program 
(Pierson 1994). 
The linkages are not formal, of course. And, to be sure, continuous administrative ini-
tiative expanded Social Security (Derthick 1979 ). But nonetheless the expectations held 
by millions of similarly situated market actors-and the actions that they undertake as a 
result-have embedded Social Security in society and the economy. Moving "off path'' -
even through a redesign of the benefit delivery mechanism such as the accounts privati-
zation promoted by President George W. Bush in 2005-is insuperably difficult. It is in 
that sense that path dependence entails "lock-in:' 
But lock-in does not always happen-indeed the why and how of retrenchment, 
backlash, and failure are enduring puzzles (Chinn 2014; Patashnik 2008). Hacker has 
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shown that retrenchment can occur through inaction and neglect as well as through 
deliberate policy change. Staszak has adapted his analytic template of unobtrusive hµt 
deep retrenchment to showing how access to the courts has gradually but thoroughly 
been reduced by a wide range of actors in the wake of the rights revolution of the mid-
twentieth century (Hacker 2004; Staszak 2015). Yet backlash can also be quite open, 
indeed unmistakable and deeply unsettling. The most spectacular case is the two-
decade long struggle to disenfranchise black Southerners, starting in Florida (1889) 
and ending in Georgia (1907). That backlash in turn restructured congressional politics 
and national policy possibilities in ways that were evident for decades, from the,'wilson 
Administration well into the 1970s. 
Another facet of APD's attention to historical dynamics is recognition that multiple 
types of change can happeri simultaneously-hence the fertile idea of multiple orders in 
action (Orren and Skowronek 2004: 108-118). Consider the separation of powers, the 
emergence of bureaucracies, the rise of policy domains, the persistence offederalism, 
the proliferation oflocal and special governments (Mullin 2009), different patterns of 
party-building ( Galvin 2009 ), the relative autonomyofpubliclaw and the courts, and the 
many institutional openings,for entrepreneurship (Sheingate 2003). American politics 
offers a vast beehive of incongruous patterns of political action. They operate according 
to different logics and "clocks;' as it were. On the other hand, the existence of multiple 
orders in action also opens up possibilities for creative political action. Entrepreneurs 
can discern and exploit the political possibilities of different orders operating in parallel. 
They can innovate new institutional forms that temporarily resolve comparable prob-
lems that actors in evolving institutional settings share (Schickler 2001). 
· To sum up, we seek to expand the range of our intuition that "history matters" into 
a working assumption that history must matter in a remarkably wide-but also quite 
specific-variety of ways. We have different names for them: regimes, orders, multiple 
orders in action, layering, path dependence, cycles, disjointed pluralism, policy feed-
back. What each of the~e terms refers to can be found in more detail in the contributions 
to the volume (see also Sheingate 2014). 
All of this, we recognize, may sound like a special case of having a hammer and find-
ing nails everywhere you look. And there is always a risk of that in social science. (For a 
crisp technical discussion of the basic problem and how to partly correct for it in large-
N analysis, see Bartels 1996.) But we think that the risk is worth tolerating. History is 
inscribed everywhere on present .Jday American politics. How could it not be given that 
the American regime is well into .its third century? · 
In fact, seeing all of the ways that history is imprinted on contemporary politics 
means that APD is very much pkrt of the ever-present work of sorting out what is going 
on currently in American politics. Recognizing that the present moment in American 
politics has been multiply constituted means that APD scholars can shed very bright 
light on the historical origins of a quite wide range of contemporary political phenom-
ena. We can explain what some otherwise puzzling current phenomenon is a case of. 
We are not limited to general remarks about how some facet of American politics arises 
from the "liberal consensus" or American exceptionalism (although that might be true 
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at some general level.) Rather, we can specifically state what the phenomenon is a case 
of, whether it will persist, and why or why not. 
To treat an important and much discussed example, when the Tea Party emerged in 
2009 Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson quickly saw that this was a recurrence 
of "federated organization'' for civic engagement. The Tea Party echoed an older style 
of civic engagement, different from the Washington-based advocacy model of profes-
sionalized organizations that serve an organizationally inactive, dues-paying member-
ship. The confidence that Skocpol and Williamson had in their hunch meant that they 
were able to richly confirm it through interview evidence and geocoded data. They were' 
able to offer the first in-depth portrait of how the Tea Party works. APD gave them the 
insight with which they could address a crying professional-and public question-
namely, what was the Tea Party? As Skocpol and Williamson showed, journalists had 
actually been unable to do that and had even offered rather misleading accounts of the 
phenomenon. APD literally came to the political science debate first in trying to identify 
the nature, significance, and likely longevity of the Tea Party ( Skocpol and Williamson 
2012). 
I 
THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFYING "WHAT 
HAPPENED"-AND DESCRIBING IT WELL 
···················································································································································································· 
Two final characteristics, in our view, distinguish APD scholarship: one, that a differ-
ent fundamental question underlies it more often than in other subfields, and two (and 
relatedly), that answering this question requires excellent writing-much different than 
the colorless, cautious prose that we too often learn to write in graduate school. 
Certainly APD scholars, like most other political· scientists, often ask "why?" As the 
previous section underscored, we also very much care about investigating "how:' by trac-
ing historical processes that shaped-and shape-American politics. Far more than other 
types of political science, however, APD also wants to know the answer to "what hap-
pened?" We alluded to this earlier, when y.e signaled the importance of "putting history 
first:' 
In the social sciences there is, quite appropriately, very strong interest in theory 
building and theory testing, and also in refining techniques for causal inference and in 
progressively ruling out rival explanations for important phenomena. As a scholarly 
community we often say that political science aspires to reducing the generalizations 
that we have, to the extent that we can do that. 
APD, however, has a strong tendency to produce new accounts of the links between 
past and present-and we make no apology for that. In that respect, APD scholars 
resemble not molecular biologists but plant or insect biologists who identify behav-
iors and species that no one previously recognized. We seek to find new things that 
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people have not seen before becaus,e we care very much about getting the answer to 
"what happened?" right. 
For example, the American welfare state is often regarded as not particularly 
generous and as built on allocating stigma for the receipt of social policy benefits 
beyond the universal programs of Social Security and Medicare. Yet Christopher 
Howard discovered a "hidden welfare state" in his first book on social policy through 
tax expenditure (Howard 1997). In turn that led him to reassess and correct a whole 
range of stylized facts about American social policy in his second book, The Welfare 
State Nobody Knows (Howard 2007). The mantra that programs for poor people are 
poor programs simply does not stand up. The growth in Medicaid expenditure in recent 
decades has been extremely robust. Stylized facts about social policy are no supstitute 
for the kind of careful attention to how direct and indirect programs actually work that 
Howard pioneered. 
Consequently much of APD consists of counterintuitive descriptive inference. 
As Keohane writes, "Descriptive inference is not the same as simple description: it 
involves an inference, from known to unknown, that can be incorrect or otherwise 
flawed. And both description f1nd descriptive inference often rest on the interpreta-
tion of inherently-sometiII).es deliberately-ambiguous actions" (Keohane 2009, 
361). 
But to do descriptive inference well means good writing and careful attention to 
the reliability of the facts one assembles and how one interprets them. We do "thick 
description'' in various sorts of ways-and increasingly with numbers and findings 
from econometrics. We do description so that we have a more accurate grasp of our 
past and a rich understanding of the historical processes that have created our present-
day politics. Our audience thus is rewarded with seeing something that it had not 
previously seen. 
Once one of us found a prize-winning APD article characterized online as 
"Wonderful on the details but woefully undertheorized:' The problem with this sort of 
criticism is that it misses the contribution: the "details" undergird the originality of the 
piece. "Wonderful" details don't just aggregate spontaneously like social insects or bac-
terial "quorum sensing:' An analyst finds them and arranges them in order to sho~ what 
previously could not be seen as readily. That can sometimes require moving theory to 
the wings of the stage. 
Consider what David Mayhew wrote of V. 0. Key Jr. ''Anyone familiar with Key's 
scholarship will be aware of his great capacity to build interesting and persuasive gen-
eral points through induction: a mastery of detail produces a wealth of proper nouns 
and telling instances, often accoajpanied by quantitative data, that march the reader to 
a conclusion'' (Mayhew 2008, 87 ). This puts the role of good writing in descriptive infer-
ence about as succinctly as it can be put. 
Description and good writing are sometimes regarded as low-tech and unsci-
entific, no more difficult than, say, developing an R package. But those who have 
read Ira Katznelson's multiple award-winning masterpiece, Fear Itself, discovered a 
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confident command of telling and eye-opening particulars. They know the difference 
that Katznelson's expository authority makes to the power of his book-and to its gen-
eral lesson that Congress did, as much as FDR-if not more-to save American democ-
racy, and to defend political democracy internationally, in the dark decades of the Great 
Depressi<:>n and WWII (Katznelson 2014). 
The larger point here is that by putting history first and knowing how to convey 
historical insight, on paper APD sharply improves political science. Indeed, we 
advance a proposition: no APD, no adequate study of American politics. A social sci-
ence that implicitly or explicitly rests on shopworn, stale, or outdated understandings 
of the political past and its relationships to the present is not-to be blunt-a social 
science. 
The American regime is now well over two centuries old. Doing history well, and cor-
rectly, eventually had to be internalized within political science-rather than remaining 
outsourced to historians. That simply is essential for the study of American politics to 
continue growing and getting better. 
To be sure, Richard John's contribution to this volume underscores that such internal-
ization is far from straightforward ~d can certainly irritate historians, not least because 
political scientists are not trained as historians. Indeed, APD scholars need to be mind-
ful of the kinds of concerns that John raises-and we need to be far more self-conscious 
about the peril of selection bias in how we use secondary sources (Lustick 1996). We 
also need-as Daniel Galvin's contribution underscores-to be more methodologically 
self-conscious, borrowing much more than we have from the qualitative methodo-
logical revolution. Recent scholarship highlights the importance of bridging the quan-
titative and qualitative divide in designing and conducting research ( e.g., Wawro and 
Katznelson 2013). But these are precisely the kinds of issues that were certain to surface 
once APD fully took root. Their emergence indeed underscores the continuing neces-
sity and expanding relevance-of the APD approach. 
RESEARCH TRAJECTORIES 
We now encourage readers to discover for themselves how scholars have engaged in 
APD inquiry by immersing themselves in the rich and diverse array of chapters contrib-
uted to this handbook. The first section features essays that consider broad perspectives 
on APD. Here we include considerations ranging from political economy and political 
culture to the role of gender and reflections on how an APD lens enables scholars to 
understand contemporary politics. The second section focuses on institutions, includ-
ing the various components of the separation of powers at the national level as well as on 
American federalism, including a focus on cities and states. The third section examines 
political processes and state-society relations, investigating such topics as representa-
tion and political parties to voting rights politics, public opinion, and interest groups. 
These chapters showcase inventive approaches to studying mass political behavior over 
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time, often in the absence of ideal data, and they indicate how an historical approach 
may challenge prevailing views. Finally, the fourth section highlights new work on how 
the state shapes the status of citizens and regulates society, shaping identities, hierar-
chies, and social relations in the United States. The foci range from a focus on race to the 
welfare state and criminal justice to sexual orientation and the family. 
As this brief summary indicates, APD scholarship is as lively, varied, and dynamic as 
the phenomena it investigates. Our discussion of backlash, retrenchment, continuities, 
recurrence,' and cycles suggest the wide assortment of patterns that scholars have identi-
fied, to say nothing of the insights of the impossibility theorems ( discussed by Jenkins in 
this volume). Political development might best be thought of-to borrow Paul Pierson's 
phrase-as, simply, "politics in time" (Pierson 2004). 
Our subfield has evolved in a wide array of directions over the past thirty years and 
in so doing it has invigorated the discipline. It enables scholars to illuminate much 
about not only the American past but also about how political processes operate and 
the broad character of the American state and governance. It gives them analytic lev-
erage, moreover, for interpreting contemporary events and politics in real time. And 
it offei:s an approach to scholarship with high potential for addressing broad con-
cerns in public affairs and engaging a wide audience including policymakers, jour-
nalists, and citizens. In that sense it fulfills one of the most important aspirations 
of social science, namely that it be broadly useful to and accessible by democratic 
citizens. 
We hope that we have given you hope for the promise of your own APD scholarship. 
NOTES 
1. A comprehensive bibliography, compiled and updated by David Brian Robertson, can be 
found at www.um;,l.edu/ ~robertsondb/sy 431bib.html 
2. See the very important registry effort at http://egap.org/about/. Also Monogan (2015). 
REFERENCES 
Allison, G. T. 1971. Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Archer, R. 2007. Why Is There No, Labor Party in the United States? Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. : 
Balogh, B. 2009. A Government out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-
century America. Cambridge: ,Cambridge University Press. 
Bartels, L. M. 1996. 'Pooling Disparate Observations: American Journal of Political Science 40: 
905-942. 
Bartels, L. M. 1998. 'Electoral Continuity and Change, 1868-1996: Electoral Studies 17: 301-326. 
Bensel, R. F. 1990. Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bensel, R. F. 2000. The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
18 SUZANNE METTLER AND RICHARD M. VALELLY 
Berinsky, A. J. 2006. '.American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s: The Analysis of Quota-
Controlled Sample Survey Data: Public Opinion Quarterly 70: 499-529. 
Berinsky, A. J., Powell, E. N., Schickler, E., and Yohai, E. B. 2011. 'Revisiting Public Opinion in 
the 1930s and 1940s: P$: Political Science & Politics 44: 515-520. 
Berk, G. 1994. Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865-1917. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Binder, S. 2003. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock. Washington, 
DC: Brooking Institution Press. 
Binder, S. 2015. 'The Dysfunctional Congress: Annual Review of Political Science 18: 85-101. 
Binder, S. and Spindel, M. 2013. 'Monetary Politics: Origins of the Federal Reserve: Studies in 
American Political Development 27: 1-13. 
Borstelmann, T. 2011. The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality . 
. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Brandwein, P. 1999. Reconstructing Reconstruction: The Supreme Court and the Production of 
Historical Truth. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Brandwein, P. 2011. Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
C~pbell, A. L. 2012. 'Policy Makes Mass Politics: Annual Review of Political Science 15: 333-351. 
Carpenter, D. P. 2001. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy 
Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Carpenter, D. P. 2010. Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical 
Regulation at the FDA. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Chinn, S. 2014. Recalibrating Reform: The Limits of Political Change. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Clemens, E. S. 1997. The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group 
Politics in the United States, 1890-1925. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Collins, R. 2007. 'Turning Points, Bottlenecks, and the Fallacies of Counterfactual History: 
Sociological Forum 22: 247-269. 
Crowe, J. 2012. Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Decanio, S. 2016. Democracy and the Origins of the.American Regulatory State. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
Derthick, M. 1979. Policymaking for Social Security. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press. 
Derthick, M. 2001. Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Dobbin, F. and Sutton, J. R. 1998. 'The Strength of a Weak State: The Rights Revolution and the 
Rise of Human Resources Management Divisions: American Journal of Sociology 104: 441-476. 
Dunlavy, C. A. 1994. Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and 
Prussia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Dykstra, R. R. and Hahn, H. 1968. 'Northern Voters and Negro Suffrage: The Case oflowa, 1868: 
Public Opinion Quarterly 32: 202-215. 
Einhorn, R. L. 2006. American Taxation, American Slavery. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., and Skocpol, T. 1985. Bringing the State Back in. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
INTRODUCTION 19 
Farhang, S. 2010. The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Galvin, D. J. 2009. Presidential Party Building Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gillman, H. 2002. 'How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal 
Courts in the United States, 1875-1891: American Political Science Review 96: 511-524. 
Gillman, H. 2006. 'Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political Origins of Liberal 
Judicial Activism: in Ronald Kahn and Ken Kersch, eds., The Supreme Court and American 
Political Development. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 
Goethe, J. W. Von. 2000 [1809]. Nicholas Boyle, ed. Selected Works: Including The So;.rows of 
Young Werther, Elective Affinities, Italian Journey, Faust. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Goldsmith, J. L. 2012. Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency after 9/11. New York: W. 
W.Norton. 
Gottschalk, M. 2014. Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Greenstone, J. D. 1977- Labor in American Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Grossman, R. S. 2013. Wrong: Nine Economic Policy Disasters and What We Can Learn from 
Them. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hacker, J. S. 2004. 'Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics 
of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States: American Political Science Review 98: 
243-260. 
Hacker, J. S. and Pierson, P. 2010. Winner-take-all Politics: How Washington Made the Rich 
Richer-and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Hansen, J. M. 1991. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Hansen, R. and King, D. S. 2013. Sterilized by the State: Eugenics, Race, and the Population Scare 
in Twentieth-Century North America. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hart, D. M. 1998. Forged Consensus: Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the United 
States, 1921-1953. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hartz, L. 1955. The Liberal, Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought 
since the Revolution. New York: Harcourt, Brace. 
Hattam, V. C. 1993. Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the 
United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hayashi, B. M. 2008. Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Haydu, J. 1998. 'Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of 
Problem Solving: American Journal of Sociology 104: 339-371. 
Howard, C. 1997. The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United 
States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton l]niversity Press. 
Howard, C. 2007. The Welfare Stat~Nobody Knows: Debunking Myths about U.S. Social Policy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Huntington, S. P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
Huntington, S. P. 1981. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press. 
Jacobs, L. and King, D. 2016. Fed Power: How Finance Wins. New York: Oxford University Press. 
20 SUZANNE METTLER AND RICHARD M. VALELLY 
Karol, D. 2007. 'Has Polling Enhanced Representation? Unearthing Evidence from Literary 
Digest Issue Polls: Studies in American Political Development 21: 16-29. 
Katznelson, I. 2014. Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Kelman, S. 1987. 'The Political Foundations of American Statistical Policy; in William Alonso 
and Paul Starr, eds: The Politics of Numbers. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 275~302. 
Keohane, R. 0. 2009. 'Political Science as a Vocation: PS: Political Science & Politics 42: 359-363. 
King, D.S. 2007. Separate and Unequal: African-Americans and the US Federal Government, 
rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 
King, D. S. and Smith, R. M. 2011. Still A House Divided: Race and Politics in Obama's America. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Kingdon J. W. 2003 [1984]. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman. 1 
Lavelle, K. C. 2013. Money and Banks in the American Political System. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lee, T. 2002. Mobilizing Public Opinion: Black Insurgency and Racial Attitudes in the Civil Rights 
Era. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Levi, M.1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Levinson, S. 2006. Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and 
How We the People Can Correct It). ~ew York: Oxford University Press. 
Lipset, S. M. and Marks, G. 2000. It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United 
States. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Lubet, S. 2010. Fugitive Justice: Runaways, Rescuers, and Slavery on Trial. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press. 
Lustick, I. S. 1996. 'History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records 
and the Problem of Selection Bias: American Political Science Review 90: 605-618. 
March, J. G. and Olsen, J.P. 2006 [1984]. 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in 
Political Life: American Political Science Review 100: 734-749. 
Mayhew, D. R. 2000. America's Congress: Actions in the Public Sphere, James Madison through 
Newt Gingrich. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Mayhew, D. R. 2002. Electoral Realignments: A Critique_ of an American Genre. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. _ / 
Mayhew, D.R. 2005. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking and Investigations, 1946-2002. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Mayhew, D. R. 2008. Parties and Policies: How the American Government Works. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
McCarty, N. M., Poole, K. T., and Rosenthal, H. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology 
and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Mettler, S. 2005. Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mettler, S. 2011. The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies Undermine American 
Democracy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Mettler, S. 2015. 'From Pioneer Egalitarianism to the Reign of the Super-Rich: How the U.S. 
Political System Has Promoted Equality and Inequality Over Time: Tax Law Review, New 
York University School of Law 68: 563-611. 
Mettler, S. and Milstein, A. 2007. '.American Political Development from Citizens' Perspective: 
Tracking Federal Government's Presence in Individual Lives over Time: Studies in American 
Political Development 21: 110-130. 
INTRODUCTION 21 
Milkis, S. M. 1999. Political Parties and Constitutional Government. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Monogan, J.E. 2015. 'Research Preregistration in Political Science: The Case, Counterarguments, 
and a Response to Critiques: PS: Political Science & Politics 48: 425-429. 
Moore, C. D. 2011. 'State Building Through Partnership: Delegation, Public-Private 
Partnerships, and the Political Development of American Imperialism, 1898-1916: Studies 
in American Political Development 25: 27-55. 
Morone, J. A. 1990. The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American 
Government. New York: Basic. 
Morone, J. A. 2003. Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History. New Haven; CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Mullin, M. 2009. Governing the Tap: Special District Governance and the New Local Politics of 
Water. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Orren, K. 1991. Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United States. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Orren, K. and Skowronek, S. 2004. The Search for American Political Development. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Parker, C. S. 2009. Fighting for Democracy: Black Veterans and the Struggle against White 
Supremacy in the Postwar South. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Patashnik, E. M. 2008. Reforms at Risk: What Happens after Major Policy Changes Are Enacted. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Pierson, P. 1993. 'When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change: World 
Politics 45: 595-628. 
Pierson, P. 1994. Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrench-
ment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pierson, P. 2000. 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics: American 
Political Science Review 94: 251-267. 
Pierson, P. 2004. Polit(cs in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Pierson, P. 2007. 'The Costs of Marginalization: Qualitative Methods in the Study of American 
Politics: Comparative Political Studies 40: 146-169. 
Pollack, S. D. 2009. War, Revenue, and State Building: Financing the Development of thr American 
State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Ritter, G. 1997. Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics of Finance, 
1865-1896. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Roberts, P. S. 2013. Disasters and the American State: How Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Public 
Prepare for the Unexpected. New'York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rockwell, S. J. 2010. Indian Affa}rs and the Administrative State in the Nineteenth Century. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Roof, T. 2011. American Labor, Congress, and the Welfare State, 1935-2010. Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
Rose, N. and Miller, P. 1992. 'Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government: 
British Journal of Sociology 43: 173-205. 
Sanders, E. 1999. Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
22 SUZANNE METTLER AND RICHARD M. VALELLY 
Schickler, E. 2001. Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the 
U.S. Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Scott, J. C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Shapiro, I. and Bedi, S. 2007. Political Contingency: Studying the Unexpected, the Accidental, and 
the Unforeseen. New York: New York University Press. 
Sheingate, A. D. 2003. 'Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American 
Political Development: Studies in American Political Development 1: 185-203. 
Sheingate, A. D. 2014. 'Institutional Dynamics and American Political Development: fonnual 
Review of Political Science 17: 461-477. ' 
Shoch, J. 2001. Trading Blows: Party Competition and U.S. Trade Policy in a Globalizing Era. 
Chapel Hill, NC: University ofNorth Carolina Press. 
Skocpol, T. 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the 
United States. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 
Skocpol, T. and Williamson, V. 2012. The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conserva-
tism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Skowronek, S. 1982. Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative 
Capacities, 1877-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Skowronek, S. 1997. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 
Smith, R. M. 1997. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
Smith, S. R. and Lipsky, M. 1993. Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Soifer, H. D. 2012. 'The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures: Comparative Political Studies 45: 
1572-1597. 
Sparrow, J. T. 2011. Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Staszak, S. L. 2015. No Day in Court: Access to Justice and the Politics of Judicial Retrenchment. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Stepan, A. and Linz, J. J. 2011. 'Comparative _Perspectives on Inequality and the Quality of 
Democracy in the United States: Perspectives on Politics 9: 841-856. 
Swift, E. K.1996. The Making of an American Senate: Reconstitutive Change in Congress, 1787-1841. 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Teles, S. M. 2008. The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the 
Law. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Thorpe, R. U. 2013. The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Tullock, G. 1981. 'Why So Much Stability: Public Choice 37: 189-204. 
Valelly, R. M. 2004. The Two Reconstructi.ons: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Valelly, R. M. 2014. 'Slavery, Emancipation, and the Civil War Transformation of the U.S. State: 
Perspectives on Politics 12: 145-152. 
Vossing, K. 2012. 'Predictably Exceptional: The Failure of Social Democracy and the Formation 
of American Labour Politics in Comparative Perspective: Party Politics 20: 767-777. 
INTRODUCTION 23 
Wawro, G. J. and Katznelson, I. 2013. 'Designing Historical Social Scientific Inquiry: How 
Parameter Heterogeneity Can Bridge the Methodological Divide between Quantitative and 
Qualitative Approaches: American Journal of Political Science 58: 526-546. 
Zackin, E. J. 2013. Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why State Constitutions Contain 
Americas Positive Rights. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Zelenak, L. 2013. Learning to Love Form 1040: Two Cheers for the Return-based Mass Income 
Tax. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
